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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis offers a discussion on some of the similarities, as well as differences, 
that exist between the approaches and arguments made by Michel Foucault and 
Norbert Elias regarding the self and society. Foucault’s works are ‘histories of the 
present’, and his key concepts of discourse, power and knowledge offer some 
useful insights regarding the notion of the self and society. Foucault argues that 
the experience of the self is cultivated within discursive formations and practices. 
Elias takes a ‘figurational’ approach to sociological inquiry, arguing that 
individuals are not static or separate from society, but are involved in constantly 
changing interdependent networks. Elias regards the sense of self – ‘habitus’ – as 
being developed within these figurations, and argues that the structural processes 
over time within Western society have moved towards a more ‘civilised’ and 
‘self-constrained’ habitus. This thesis offers discussion regarding the convergence 
and alignment present between the works of Foucault and Elias, and argues that 
each may contribute to the other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis offers a discussion on some of the similarities that exist between the 
approaches and arguments made by Michel Foucault and Norbert Elias regarding 
the self and society. I will discuss some of the work of Michel Foucault, with a 
particular focus on his analytical approach, discussing the methods and key 
concepts he developed for analysing and viewing the social world, as well as how 
he utilised this approach to analyse selfhood in what he calls ‘the technologies of 
the self’. The thesis will also explore the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias 
and how he utilised this approach to analyse the self and the ‘civilizing 
processes’, as well as his criticism of the notion of the self as homo clausus. 
Importantly, I will demonstrate some of the similarities that are present between 
the approaches taken by the two scholars in their works on the self, and aim to 
reopen the scholarship regarding the convergence of their approaches. 
 
Much of Foucault’s work is what he calls a ‘history of the present’, which 
involves focusing on some current problem or issue and then tracing the 
historical contingencies and continuities that shaped the issue. Foucault’s 
understanding of history is significantly different to that of traditional 
historiography in that he viewed history not as a single, unified object, but as 
being continuously shifting, overlapping and retold (1972, pp. 3, 9-10). In his 
later works, Foucault focused his analyses on the ways in which discursive 
techniques and practices come to shape the experience of the self and the 2 
 
behaviours which result; Foucault emphasised the capacity of discourses to 
“shape, constrict, and distort human impulses and the sense of self” (Smith, 
1999, p. 81). Foucault provides a researcher with a ‘toolbox’ of methods and 
approach (O’Farrell, 2005, p. 50), particularly regarding the self, and this 
thesis will discuss what these tools are and how he applied them to the study 
of the self. 
 
In The Civilizing Process (2000), Elias explores how the structure of society 
is in a constant process of change, as well as how these processes led to 
changes in standards of behaviour and the sense of self – to changes in 
individual ‘habitus’ (2000, p. xi). The approach developed by Elias is one 
which understands society as a process of changing figurations, where 
figurations refers to the networks of social interdependencies among human 
beings (2000, pp. 481-482). Using this approach, Elias argues that social 
processes during the early formation of what we call ‘states’ led to changes in 
interpersonal behaviour to more controlled, peaceful and less impulsive 
forms, and to a type of ‘self-restraint’ towards ‘civility’ (Elias, 2000, p. xi). 
 
It may at first appear that the approaches taken by Foucault and Elias toward 
understanding the self and society have little in common (Smith, 1999, p. 79). 
Foucault’s account of the self and society regards the ‘truth’ of the self as existing 
in discursive formations produced through various practices and techniques of 
power and the self (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18), while Elias understands the sense of 
self and the related forms of behaviour as being acquired within the 3 
 
interdependent networks of humans, such as within families and nations – that is, 
forms of behaviour and a sense of self are acquired “in conjunction with other 
people, from the structure of society in which the individual grows up” (Elias, 
1991, p. 36). An example of the distinct difference between the two scholars, 
pointed out by Dennis Smith (1999, p. 80), is that Elias relied quite explicitly on 
the work of Sigmund Freud and the psychoanalytical school of thought (Elias, 
2000, p. 527), while Foucault’s work, particularly in Volume 1 of The History of 
Sexuality (2008a), argued quite strongly against Freud’s ‘repressive hypothesis’ 
(Foucault, 2008a, p. 10). 
 
Nonetheless, I was struck by some of the similarities that exist between the 
arguments and thinking of Foucault and Elias, particularly in their arguments 
regarding the self and society. Robert van Krieken (1990) and Dennis Smith 
(1999) have provided useful discussions on some of the ways in which 
similarities exist between the approaches of Foucault and Elias. Also, Andrea 
Bührman and Stefanie Ernst (2010) edited a publication which explored some of 
the similarities regarding Foucault and Elias, with a focus on how their works can 
be utilised towards analysis of the 21
st century. However, apart from these works, 
the scholarship is considerably lacking and it is an area that is open for further 
work and discussion; therefore, this thesis aims to reopen the discussion and 
scholarship regarding the similarities between the approaches and arguments of 
Foucault and Elias. This thesis will demonstrate some of the ways in which their 
approaches converge, and in doing so, argue that researchers aiming to study the 4 
 
self and society may be able to utilise a unique combination of Foucault’s and 
Elias’ approaches. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One will introduce some of the key concepts and methods developed and 
utilised by Foucault, which have provided a variety of scholars with a ‘toolbox’ 
for analysing the social world (O’Farrell, 2005, p. 50). Accordingly, this chapter 
will discuss Foucault’s understanding of discourse and his non-traditional view of 
power, which are essential concepts for understanding what Foucault’s approach 
involves. This chapter will also discuss Foucault’s archaeological and 
genealogical methods for exploring the history of some topic of inquiry. After 
discussing Foucault’s methods, the chapter will then focus on Foucault’s 
approach to the experience of the self through techniques of governmentality and 
the ‘technologies of the self’. These refer to the practices and systems of 
knowledge which are utilised by the individual to subjectify themselves and thus 
cultivate their sense and experience of selfhood. This chapter will show how 
Foucault utilises his methods to explore the historical contingencies of the self, 
and demonstrate some the ways in which his approach can be useful. 
 
Chapter Two will then turn to the work of Elias, discussing his approach of 
figurational sociology and how this was utilised to explore the notion of homo 
clausus (the enclosed human), and the ‘civilizing processes’ of the self. The 
purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Elias’ work regarding his 5 
 
unique understanding of the self, and his approach and arguments regarding the 
self and society. This will provide the basis for further discussion in Chapter 
Three on the ways in which Foucault’s and Elias’ approaches converge, as well as 
how they may offer further insights for new research. 
 
Chapter Three will focus on the similarities and differences that are present in the 
approaches taken by Foucault and Elias. Specifically, this chapter will offer some 
discussion on the similarities, as well as noting some differences, that are present 
in their conceptions and approaches to power, their similar approach to undermine 
the notion of the self as operating separately to society, their similar (but also 
different) take on the development of knowledge, their mutual sense of a 
transition in Western history towards a changing sense of self, and the ways in 
which both scholars approach the concern for the self or self-constraint. I will 
argue here that there is some junction in both the approaches and arguments taken 
by Foucault and Elias regarding the self and society. 
 
Overall, this thesis will provide the reader with an understanding of Foucault’s 
methods and demonstrate their usefulness by showing how he utilised them to 
explore the ‘techniques of the self’. I will compare and contrast these with Elias’ 
figurational approach to the self and the ‘civilizing processes’ and demonstrate 
the convergence that exists in their respective approaches and arguments, arguing 
that both scholars offer useful approaches that may be able to be utilised in 
conjunction in future research. It is important to note that this thesis does not aim 
to criticise Foucault’s and Elias’ respective approaches and arguments, since that 6 
 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, this thesis does not aim to discuss 
all of Foucault’s and Elias’ arguments or works (since that is also beyond the 
scope), but to provide the reader with a good understanding of both scholars’ 
approaches to the self and society, and also to demonstrate to the reader how these 
approaches and arguments have some similarities, despite their differences.  
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CHAPTER 1 – Foucault’s Approach: Discourse, Power and the 
Genealogy of the Self 
 
This chapter aims to explore what Foucault’s key concepts and methods are and 
what they provide him with the capacity to do in his work, as well as show how 
he applies this approach to the study of the self and society. For Foucault, ‘truth’ 
is not universal, fundamental or innate. With his concepts of discourse and power, 
Foucault was interested in how ‘games of truth’ produce bodies of knowledge 
through which the ‘truth’, as an assumed universality, is told; these discourses 
produce the framework through which we understand and view the world, and 
thus our current way of viewing the ‘truth’, and viewing ourselves, is determined 
by the discourses within which we operate. This chapter introduces what it means 
to take a Foucaultian approach to the analysis of some problem or topic, and will 
then explore Foucault’s study of the self through techniques of governmentality 
and technologies of the self. In this chapter, I will first explore Foucault’s notion 
of discourse in further detail; this is followed by a discussion on Foucault’s 
understanding of power and its relation to the production of bodies of knowledge, 
and by a discussion of Foucault’s historical methods of archaeology and 
genealogy, which act as the tools utilised to reveal the ways in which what is 
assumed to be true is historically contingent. Once Foucault’s key concepts and 
methods are properly understood, the chapter will then turn to Foucault’s analysis 
of the cultivation of the self through techniques of governmentality and 
technologies of the self. 
 8 
 
Foucault’s Concepts and Approach 
Discourse 
For Foucault, the notion of discourse refers to a set of statements and practices 
which are regular and systematic in their organisation; discourses are productive 
in nature, and produce ‘knowledge’ and ‘truths’ – they systematically create and 
construct the knowledges and subjects about which they are concerned and of 
which they speak, and thus inform the mythologies and frameworks that societies 
have for understanding and viewing the world (Foucault, 1971, p. 8; Kendall and 
Wickham, 1999, p. 34). As discourses develop, they not only provide social actors 
with specific and delimited ways of understanding the world, but also produce the 
subject of which they speak. That is not to say that discourses construct objects 
and subjects metaphysically (or, fundamentally), but construct them in the sense 
that any meaning attached to them, and the ‘truths’ which we understand to 
belong to them, are produced and reproduced through discourse. It is within 
discourses themselves that meanings, understandings and knowledges exist (Hall, 
2001, pp. 72-73). For example, before the current discourse on sexuality 
developed, starting in the 18
th century, there was not a discursive ‘void’ – the 
precursors to this discourse, such as the alliance of kinship ties and the use of 
pleasure based on self-mastery, existed, as did the object itself (sex) – but the 
current understandings of what sexuality is and how it plays out in the social 
world are developed through the discourse itself (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, p. 
35). In this way, discourses are innovative and may change. Foucault uses this 
notion of discourse to provide histories of systems of thought in order to observe 
the different, changing and historically contingent instances of the material 9 
 
conditions by which the world is understood and constructed (Kendall and 
Wickham, 1999, pp. 34-35). 
 
Although this at first appears somewhat abstract in nature, discourse actually 
exists in explicit and observable instances – discourse is the corpus of statements 
(where statements are both practices and discursive words) about a particular 
topic (Foucault, 1991b, p. 54). Discourse does not exist within thinking or 
cognition, but within the materials of discourse – discourses are not the product 
of private thinking or thought processes, but the product of the operation of public 
apparatuses which exist no ‘deeper’ than on the social ‘surface’. Discourse exists 
not only in linguistics, but within the organisation of practices and statements, and 
within the rules which organise those linguistics (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, 
pp. 36-38). In this sense, discourses take their form within a variety of 
mechanisms, such as books, journal articles, formal and informal discussions, 
letters, court judgements and government proceedings. Further to this, there is no 
‘outside’ to discourse; that is to say that we do not assume a ‘deeper outside’ that 
exists beyond the material conditions of discourse, and there is no external 
‘reality’ of some topic that exists beyond discourse (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, 
pp. 36-38).  
 
Foucault starts from a standpoint far different from traditional history; whereas 
traditional history presumes ‘already given objects’, Foucault starts from the 
decision that ‘universals’ do not exist: 10 
 
I start from the theoretical and methodological decision that consists in 
saying…How can you write history if you do not accept a priori the 
existence of things like the state, society, the sovereign, and 
subjects…So what I would like to deploy here is exactly the opposite of 
historicism: not, then, questioning universals by using history as a 
critical method, but starting from the decision that universals do not 
exist, asking what kind of history we can do (Foucault, 2008b, pp. 2-3). 
In such a way, anything we take to be universally true is true only within 
discourse (Foucault, 2008b, p. 3). For example, the notion of sexuality is itself 
developed and maintained within discourse, and it does not exist in some external 
‘reality’ (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, p. 38). In this sense, discourse is not 
abstract or cognitive, nor is there an external ‘reality’ to which a discourse refers 
(although a discourse, in its ‘truth-telling’ nature, will claim or assume to do so); 
rather, discourse exists within the specific material conditions of a particular topic 
– there is only the surface material conditions of discourse, and that is where 
Foucault focuses his analyses, which he argues is significantly different to a 
traditional historiography (Foucault, 1972, p. 127; Kendall and Wickham, 1999, 
p. 38). 
 
Not everything is discourse, and Foucault does not deny the existence of the non-
discursive, such as the entity which is the ‘body’. However, non-discursive 
entities do not exist within a non-discursive ‘vacuum’ – the non-discursive is 
influenced by, and is under the sovereignty of, discourse (Kendall and Wickham, 
1999, p. 39). For example, sex may be considered a non-discursive act, and 
bodies are non-discursive entities, but the words themselves are discursive, as are 11 
 
the conceptualisations attributed to them. Further, the ways in which bodies are 
understood and acted upon within the social world, including the act of sex, are 
determined and controlled by discourse – sexual acts are influenced by discourses 
on sexuality, such as the discourses of Christian ethics and the apparatuses of the 
Church, which delimit what can and cannot be said, as well as what can and 
cannot be practiced (Foucault, 1990, pp. 10-13; Kendall and Wickham, 1999, p. 
39). In this way, Foucault’s notion of discourse encompasses the discursive and 
the non-discursive, which are inseparable – discourse is continuously 
encompassing the non-discursive, and a practice is both material and discursive 
(Kendall and Wickham, 1999, p. 46). 
 
By exploring and analysing discourse, Foucault is interested not only in the 
content of some discourse, but also (and more specifically) the rules which 
determine the production of that discourse; as Foucault says, “the production of 
discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to 
a certain number of procedures” (1971, p. 8). These rules form the discourse in its 
regular and systematic organisation; that is, a discourse is defined as 
individualised by its set of rules of formation for all of its statements, rather than 
by its specific content (Foucault, 1991b, p. 54). While concepts and statements 
within the same discursive formation may be incongruent or incompatible with 
one another, they follow the same set of rules in their formation, and “there is an 
individualized discursive formation whenever it is possible to define such a set of 
rules” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 54). For example, Foucault is not interested in the 
fixed meanings of symbols and words as such, but the rules by which particular 12 
 
meanings are established within a specific discourse; these rules can be seen as 
practiced through public apparatuses such as schooling, church rituals and 
publication processes (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, p. 43). Further to this, of 
interest to Foucault are the rules which mark the boundaries about what can and 
cannot be said within a particular discourse – discourses produce ‘truths’ about 
particular topics, and in doing so delimit what is sayable and thinkable (Foucault, 
1971, p. 8). For example, within the current biomedical discourse it could be said 
that some disease is caused by a particular virus in the blood-stream, but any 
explanation which employs witchcraft or alternative medical frameworks as its 
root – such as the malady being the result of the particular phase of the moon, or 
the misalignment of the spine, respectively – cannot be accepted as ‘true’ within 
the discourse, and is disallowed and excluded. That is, there are rules about what 
can and cannot be said, and these rules organise the production of discourses and 
their knowledges, as well as what new statements can be made (Kendall and 
Wickham, 1999, p. 44). In such a way, ‘games of truth’ lead to the facilitation of 
relations of power, and thus power and knowledge are intimately linked within 
discourse (Foucault, 1995, pp. 27-28). 
 
Power and Knowledge 
Traditional perspectives view power as a zero-sum quantitative capacity, where 
power is something ‘possessed’ in quantitative amounts by individuals or 
institutions, and by which those who hold more of it utilise it as a tool of 
domination over others (Hindess, 1996, p. 2). With this understanding of power, 
we are limited in that it is only by observing overt (or, sometimes covert) conflicts 
that we can determine and discuss the distribution of power (Helliwell and 13 
 
Hindess, 1999, p. 77; Lukes 1974, pp. 12-13). Foucault’s understanding of power 
differs significantly from traditional perspectives – Foucault is interested in how 
power is exercised rather than in how it is theoretically constructed. For Foucault, 
power is not a quantitative object, as he argues: 
Power is never something that someone possesses, any more than it is 
something that emanates from someone. Power does not belong to 
anyone or even to a group; there is only power because there is 
dispersion, relays, networks, reciprocal supports, differences of 
potential, discrepancies, etcetera. It is in this system of differences, 
which have to be analyzed, that power can start to function (Foucault, 
2006, p. 4). 
Likewise, in an interview with Clare O’Farrell in 1981, Foucault said that it is 
relations of power that are everywhere, rather than ‘power’ itself (O’Farrell, 
1997, p. 6). In this way, power functions within the relations between people, 
institutions and bodies of knowledge – power is not a ‘thing’ so much as it is a 
function of these networks, and these systems of relations are where power exists, 
where it is ‘at play’ (O’Farrell, 1997, p. 6). As Foucault writes, “we need to cut 
off the King’s head” (Foucault, 1980, p.121), purporting that an understanding of 
power needs to shift away from a traditional, hierarchical and quantitative view of 
power as a possession, and towards this relational understanding of power as a 
“complex strategical situation” (Foucault, 2008a p. 93). For example, King 
George III was able to direct power because the body of knowledge, the 
discourse, regarding his kingship allowed it as ‘true’ that he possessed or was the 
director of such power. However, when he became ‘mentally ill’, the discourse 
regarding his health and the appropriate treatment meant he was no longer able to 14 
 
direct this power – power was not a possession, but a relation between people and 
knowledge, or ‘truth’. It serves as an effective example, because King George III 
was confined to his room where those who cared for him now held relational 
power over him; so, power is not a possession, but a relation, and it is by the 
changing relations and discourses that the exercise of power changes (Foucault, 
2006, pp. 20-21).  
 
Furthermore, traditional perspectives which view power as something to be 
possessed fail to recognise power as a productive force. Importantly, Foucault 
understood power as being productive, rather than as a solely repressive force 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 94), stating that “power is not bad in itself” (in O’Farrell, 
1997, p. 6). In contemporary Western societies, which emphasise individual rights 
and freedom, power relations are both coercive and productive – that is, power 
produces individuals who perform particular actions, shapes what people do and 
what they value, who they take themselves to be, and their practices (Rose, 2000, 
p. 313). As O’Farrell (2011) writes:  
There is a difference between the kind of relationship of power between 
teacher and student which takes the opportunity to deploy effects of 
domination and authoritarianism, and the kind which uses mechanisms 
of power (such as those involved in the transmission of knowledge and 
assessment) to guide the students’ behaviour and knowledge in useful 
and helpful ways, while still retaining a respect for the students’ 
freedom (O’Farrell, 2011, n.p.).   15 
 
In such a way, Foucault’s notion of power can be understood as being exercised 
upon free individuals, and when it is exercised it influences their actions and 
produces particular behaviours and forms of self-concern. Rather than viewing 
those subjected to technologies of power as being without power themselves, 
Foucault argues that individuals are free to make choices (particularly in 
contemporary Western societies), and when power is exercised it influences what 
these choices are – it influences what behaviours are enacted by its subjects 
(Hindess, 1996, pp. 99-100; Rose, 1999, p. 95). In this sense, Foucaultian power 
can be described as the ‘structure of actions’ – the instruments, technologies and 
procedures – that bears upon the free individual, and which produces forms of 
behaviour (Hindess, 1996, p. 100). 
 
Power is also productive in that it produces forms of knowledge, and power can 
only be properly understood through its relation with knowledge. As Foucault 
writes: 
Power produces knowledge…power and knowledge directly imply one 
another…[and] there is no power relation without a correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (Foucault 
1995, p. 27). 
Speaking the ‘truth’ is always produced through discourse and discursive 
practices – discourses and their related practices are ‘games of truth’, movements 
and resistances which produce systems of thought (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18; 
Foucault, 1990, p. 8). Foucault is not interested in what is true or not true, since 16 
 
that would be to presume the universality of some truth; rather, Foucault is 
interested in the ‘games of truth’ which come to produce truths as forms of 
knowledge (Foucault, 1995, p. 28), and Foucault is also interested in questioning 
these things that are taken as a given (Foucault, 2008b, pp. 2-3). Foucault’s notion 
of these ‘games of truth’ shows how the assumption or acceptance that a 
particular body of knowledge is ‘true’ facilitates relations and regimes of power. 
For example, the acceptance of the psychiatric bodies of knowledge as ‘true’ 
facilitates the power of these regimes: it is in the ‘games of truth’, the acceptance 
of ‘truth’, that regimes are given power. In such a way, psychiatric institutions are 
facilitated to categorise and produce knowledge about subjects and recommend 
and enact particular medical interventions. In such a way, ‘games of truth’ lead to 
the facilitation of relations of power, and thus power and knowledge are 
intimately linked within discourse (Foucault, 1995, pp. 27-28). 
 
Foucaultian power also differs from the traditional notion of power in that it 
presupposes the capacity of the individual to act, to resist, and this resistance is 
key in power relations (Foucault, 2008a, p. 95; Rose, 1999, p. 95). Firstly, forms 
of knowledge, and the categories of subjects that they create, are taken to be 
universal, are assumed to be ‘true’. However, since these forms of categorisation 
are historically contingent and not ‘innate’ categories (whether they be categories 
such as ‘sexually deviant, ‘mentally ill’, and so on), they eventually reveal 
themselves as contingent as the bodies of knowledge change, and thus the 
categorisations are resisted as not universal. That is, subjects who are categorised 
by forms of knowledge and power can, and often do, resist these categorisations 
as not universal; (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, p. 50; Rose, 1999, p. 95). For 17 
 
example, homosexuality was once categorised as a mental disorder within the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, a psychiatric manual containing all ‘known’ 
(or rather, accepted) mental disorders and their criteria for diagnosis (Silverstein, 
2009, p. 161). However, through the resistance by subjects of this categorisation, 
this ‘truth’, and the discursive knowledge informing the categorisation, was 
revealed as ‘incorrect’, as ‘disallowed’, and it was ‘declassified’ as a mental 
disorder (Silverstein, 2009, p. 161). Certainly, within various forms of scientific 
discourse there are often resistances to ‘truths’, and these resistances are ongoing 
relations that further produce forms of knowledge. In this way, it can be seen that 
Foucaultian power is characterised by the relations and resistances that occur 
between a variety of actors, institutions and bodies of knowledge. Power exists in 
the relations, techniques and resistances employed by individuals and institutions, 
and it does not exist outside these relations as something to be possessed – “there 
is no ‘escaping’ it” (Foucault, 2008a, p. 95). 
 
Archaeology and Genealogy 
Foucault’s analytical approach is historical in nature, but shifts away from 
traditional period-based history, selecting a particular problem and exploring 
and analysing the various and changing discourses of which that problem is a 
part (Foucault, 1972, pp. 9-10). Fundamental to Foucault’s approach is to 
allow investigation to surprise us, and also to realise that, given the 
innovative nature of discourse, history does not stop. Further, the current state 
of things within a particular domain of reference is considered more 
haphazard in its production, rather than being the result of teleological 18 
 
development leading to a final ‘true’ state of things – that is, history is not so 
much teleological as it is haphazard, or the result of any number of potential 
contingencies (Foucault, 1972, p. 5; Kendall and Wickham, 1999, pp. 22-23). 
Further, Foucault regards history as continuously changing, overlapping and 
being constantly retold, rather than as a unified object (Foucault, 1972, p. 9).  
 
Foucault uses the methods of archaeology and genealogy (with genealogy 
being an extension or successor to archaeology) to perform his analyses of the 
history of systems of thought. Foucault’s approach is a ‘general’ history, as 
opposed to a ‘total’ history. While a ‘total history’ is “one that seeks to 
reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principle… of a society… - 
what is called metaphorically a ‘face’ of a period” (Foucault, 1972, p. 9), and 
which views history as unified and ‘total’, a ‘general history’ is one that 
concentrates on describing differences, transformations and continuities 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 9-10). Both archaeology and genealogy are methods 
which analyse the discursive statement as it occurs ‘in the archive’ – that is, 
Foucault is interested in describing discourse as it is, seeking to provide no 
more than a description of regularities, differences and so on without 
interpretation or making judgements of ‘deeper’ meanings (Foucault, 1972, p. 
10). Foucault seeks to describe the archive and identify “the rules of its 
formation in discourse itself” (Foucault, 1972, p. 79). Likewise, Foucault’s 
approach focuses on the statements themselves (both practices and texts), 
rather than on the authors of those statements, and without seeking to source 
meaning from human beings. In this way, Foucault explores discourses as 
they appear, without moving to ‘deeper’ levels, such as cognition and 19 
 
psychology, or an external ‘reality’ – Foucault explores the surface, since that 
is where discourse exists (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, pp. 25-26). 
 
When Foucaultian archaeology is applied, it focuses its gaze entirely upon 
statements as they appear within the archive, and so uncovers the nature of 
the discourses within that specific domain of reference (Foucault, 1972, p. 
131). In doing so, the archaeological method attempts to describe the relations 
between what is practiced and what is said (between the visible and the 
sayable) – in this way, the analysis uncovers the varying ways in which the 
knowledges of a discourse are composed of both the sayable and of practices. 
Moreover, archaeological analysis uncovers the relation between one 
statement and another, as well as the ways in which a discourse is organised 
and in what ways, by what rules, and in what ‘surfaces of emergence’ it is 
produced (Kendall and Wickham, 1999, pp. 26-27). For example, Foucault’s 
analysis in The Use of Pleasure (1990) (Volume 2 of The History of 
Sexuality) explores the ways in which particular procedures are used by 
church authorities and the ways in which these inform and produce further 
discursive material and practices in an organised and repeatable way, such as 
sexual interdictions and their appearance in texts and sermons, and the 
practices which result (Foucault, 1990, pp. 10-13). Furthermore, the 
archaeological analysis may describe the ways in which a discourse 
constructs and maintains the positions between subjects (or, people) in 
regards to those statements. That is, it focuses on the ways in which 
statements produce particular positions or ways of being (subjectification), 
such as ‘insane’, ‘priest’ or ‘sexual deviant’, which are ways of being that 20 
 
exist only within the framework of a specific discourse (or discourses) 
(Kendall and Wickham, 1999, pp. 26-27). The analysis that a researcher 
conducts may not necessarily cover every archaeological aspect of some 
discourse, but will be focused on the specific ‘problem’ in mind. 
 
Genealogy, as an extension of the archaeological method, is composed of 
many, if not all, of the aspects of archaeology. Foucault borrowed the term 
from Nietzsche, but Foucaultian genealogy is different (Foucault, 1986a). On 
top of the components of the archaeological method, a genealogy is also 
concerned with the analysis of power, focusing on the origins and functions 
of some issue or discursive formations, such as Foucault does in his analyses 
of psychiatry, and sexuality in its different forms (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, 
p. 29). Foucault viewed modern philosophy (mostly since Kant) as being in 
two distinct camps; on the one hand, there are those who are dedicated to the 
‘analytics of truth’ (Foucault, 1988c, p. 95), who attempt to find the essential 
rationality in the Enlightenment (Foucault, 1986b, p. 43). On the other hand, 
there are those who are concerned with the ‘ontology of ourselves’ (Foucault, 
1988c, p. 95), who operate within a ‘framework’ of uncertainty and who 
attempt to limit their imposition of judgement on what they analyse, and who 
see humans as “beings who are historically determined” (Foucault, 1986b, p. 
43). Foucault regards the genealogical method as being one which is 
concerned with the ‘ontology of ourselves’, aiming to ‘flush out’ the 
assumptions of certain ‘truths’ that exist within discourse (Foucault, 1986b, p. 
43). It differs from archaeology in that it pays particular attention to the 
processes of change, and of continuation, that exist within discourse – while 21 
 
archaeology is interested in a particular ‘historical slice’, genealogy is 
interested in historical processes and transformations (Kendall and Wickham, 
1999, pp. 30-31). 
 
Foucault’s approach comes from a position of not presuming ‘truths’ as given 
(Foucault, 1986b, p. 43), essentially arguing that we cannot use our rationality 
and frameworks for understanding the world as our tools for analysing the 
world. That is, we cannot use the discourses in which we find ourselves 
embedded as the tools for analysing the social world, since these frameworks 
are historically contingent and changing. We would be misled to use them as 
lenses for judging or interpreting the world, and any analyses we would make 
would show more about the discourses in which we operate than the problem 
itself. Foucault argues that the purpose of his approach is: 
To identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or, conversely, the 
complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty 
calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and 
have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the 
root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents 
(Foucault, 1986, p. 81). 
In such a way, Foucaultian analysis of some problem is interested in what the 
problem looks like as it appears on the surface, how its discourse is produced 
and how it has changed, or continued, over time. In doing so, we can uncover 
the problem and the discourses to be seen more clearly, and with keener 
perspective. Foucault is not interested in uncovering some objective truth, but 22 
 
in the ‘games of truth’ which occur within discursive formations, in exploring 
discourses and bodies of knowledge and in revealing that things are not as 
self-evident as we take them to be – to reveal that what we presume to be true 
is, in fact, cultivated within discursive formations and not universal, 
fundamental or given (Foucault, 1972, p. 127). In such a way, it can be seen 
that Foucault’s approach to social analysis involves a significant shift from 
traditional historical approaches. Foucault’s focus is towards the ways in 
which ‘truths’ are formed, in what ways bodies of knowledge are taken as a 
given, and how they influence the ways of understanding the world, the self 
and thus the behaviours which result. Foucault’s approach is widely 
considered a ‘toolbox’ for researchers to utilise (O’Farrell, 2005, p. 50), and 
Foucault himself used this toolbox, particularly in his later years, to analyse 
the self and society – specifically, the techniques of governmentality and the 
‘technologies of the self’. 
 
Foucault’s Approach to the Self and Subjectification 
Foucault regards the transition from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’ as being a 
process of change of forms of governing from Middle Age forms of discipline 
and sovereignty (which set limits and constraints) to the modern form of 
government with the specific end of achieving stable populations (1991a; van 
Krieken, 1990). Further, Foucault regards this transition towards ‘modernity’ 
as a: 
Tendency which, over a long period throughout the West, has steadily 
led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, 23 
 
discipline, etc.) of this type of power… resulting, on the one hand, in 
the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, 
and, on the other, in development of a whole complex of savoirs 
(Foucault, 1991a, pp. 102-103). 
For Foucault, savoirs refers to the formation of forms of knowledge, to 
discursive formations (2010, p. 41). In this way, Foucault argues that there 
has been a process of change from systems of rule involving Middle Age 
forms of sovereignty towards current forms of governmentality (1991a). 
Foucault argues that this modern from of government, which he labels 
‘governmentality’, refers to all the components that make up a government 
that has the maintenance of a stable, contented and well-ordered population as 
its end, achieving a sense of wellbeing among the population through a 
variety of ‘techniques of the self’ utilising bodies of knowledge (1991a, p. 
102).  
 
Further to this, governmentality refers to the ‘art of government’, where 
government is understood as encompassing the strategies for ‘the conduct of 
conduct’ (Foucault, 1991a; Gordon, 1991, p. 48). In such a way, Foucault is 
interested in the range of attempts by authorities of various sorts (such as the 
Church, educational institutions, medical practitioners) “to act upon the 
actions of others” (Rose, 2000, p. 315), to ‘conduct their conduct’, taking as 
their object various things, such as self-realisation, discipline, productivity 
and social harmony. In taking this approach, Foucault was then led to focus 
on the strategies for the ‘conduct of conduct’ which operate as the 24 
 
‘technologies of the self’, through which individuals experience themselves, 
judge themselves, and in doing so ‘conduct their own conduct’ (Foucault, 
1988a, p. 19; Rose, 2000, p. 315). Foucault’s work on governmentality marks 
a shift towards a focus on power and bodies of knowledge as they relate 
between an individual and themselves as the ‘subject’ (Foucault, 1991a). 
Foucault argues that governmentality refers to “this contact between 
technologies of domination of others and those of the self” (Foucault, 1988a, 
p. 19). In Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality (2008a), Foucault emphasises 
the ways in which the discourses on sexuality have played a central role in 
shaping, constricting and delimiting the impulses of humans and the 
experience of the self as a subject of desire and sexuality – that is, sexuality is 
taken as a key component of the sense of self, and ways in which subjects 
conduct themselves are accordingly influenced (Foucault, 2008a). Here, 
Foucault is interested in technologies and systems of authority through which 
subjects come to cultivate and experience themselves in a particular way and 
is therefore concerned with the process of ‘subjectification’ (Foucault, 1986a; 
2008a). 
 
In an interview near the end of his life (conducted by Rux Martin), Foucault 
stated, “Everybody both acts and thinks. The way people act or react is linked 
with thought, and of course thinking is related to tradition” (in Martin, 1988, 
p. 14). In his later work, Foucault became interested in how individuals come 
to constitute themselves as subjects, through techniques of the self. In 
Volumes 2 and 3 of The History of Sexuality (The Use of Pleasure (1990) and 25 
 
The Care of the Self (1988b), respectively), Foucault was interested in 
exploring practices of the self in some detail, and the importance of ‘taking 
care of oneself’. Foucault wanted to continue his work in this area with 
further investigation of the practices and techniques through which 
individuals cultivate their sense of self by acting on their own bodies, 
feelings, thoughts and conduct in order to reach their ‘true’ selves. 
Accordingly, Foucault began to produce a genealogy of subjectification, one 
that was not solely focused on sex and sexuality (Martin, Gutman and Hutton, 
1988, p. 4).  
 
For Foucault, ‘subjectification’ is a term which refers to the processes and 
practices through which human beings come to relate to themselves as certain 
sorts of ‘persons’, to view themselves as subjects of a particular sort. A 
genealogy of subjectification is one that explores the relations which human 
beings have established with themselves – it explores our relation to ourselves 
and the technical forms that facilitate these relations (Foucault, 1986a; Rose, 
2000, p. 311). As such, a genealogy of subjectification focuses on the 
changing practices and techniques of self-conduct and cultivation of the self 
(that is, on the changing technologies of the self) (Du Gay, 2007, pp. 42-43). 
It is important to note that, in this endeavour, Foucault is not concerned with 
describing the birth of self-identity or the narrative history of the ‘person’ as a 
psychological entity in order to examine how different historical periods have 
produced humans with different psychological characteristics. This would be 
to presume a particular concept of the ‘person’ (a contemporary conception of 26 
 
the ‘person’) as a psychologised, individualised and interiorised entity (Du 
Gay, 2007, p. 43; Rose, 2000, p. 321). Rather, Foucault’s genealogy of 
subjectification is concerned with examining the diverse and changing (and 
historically contingent) practices through which individuals cultivate 
themselves into certain sorts of persons, as subjects (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18; 
Rose, 2000, p. 321). 
 
Our relation with ourselves has assumed its particular form because it has 
been the object of methods and practices – technologies – that have sought to 
shape our understandings and conduct within the social world, and with 
various objectives in mind, such as masculinity, femininity, virtue and 
pleasure (Rose, 2000, pp. 311-312). As Foucault writes: 
Technologies of the self…permit individuals to effect by their own 
means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their 
own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18). 
In such a way, technologies of the self are techniques for conducting one’s 
self, for cultivating and disciplining the self in a particular way and for 
experiencing oneself accordingly. These techniques are embodied in 
particular practices (such as confession, diary-keeping and surveillance) and 
are utilised in such a way that they enable the individual to observe or think 
of themselves as a particular type of subject and to then ‘conduct their own 
conduct’ accordingly (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18; Rose, 2000, p. 315). Further to 27 
 
this, and importantly, these sorts of practices and techniques are always 
conducted within an actual or imagined system of authority that provides a 
normalising discursive ‘truth’ (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18; Rose, 2000, p. 313).   
 
It may appear at first that technology is separate to the domain of human 
beings (that is, is separate to being a human, and a ‘person’), however, our 
very experience of ourselves as certain sorts of ‘persons’ is the result of the 
deployment of various human technologies that take ways of being human 
(ways of understanding and conducting oneself) as their object. It is important 
to note that when referring to technologies, Foucault is referring to the 
assemblage of discourses, techniques, knowledges, languages, instruments, 
systems of judgements, buildings and spaces of the social world, which are 
underpinned by an objective or purpose of production of some kind for 
human beings (whether it be the production of something material or abstract) 
(Foucault, 1988a, p. 18; Rose, 2000, p. 313). For example, the school, 
hospital and prison can all be regarded as such technologies, which utilise 
discipline, surveillance and normalising judgements in order to cultivate the 
self as a certain type of subject – one who is surveyed and who conducts their 
own conduct (Rose, 2000, p. 313). Here the ‘conduct of conduct’ refers to the 
ways in which individuals experience, shape, judge and understand 
themselves as certain sorts of subjects; individuals are subjects of 
technologies of the self, and these technologies are embodied in particular 
practices and methods (Gordon, 1991, p. 48; Rose, 2000, p. 315). In his later 
work, Foucault focused his attention on these technologies of the self, and 28 
 
utilised his analytical approach, as discussed earlier in the chapter, to explore 
the varying ways in which individuals have come to be concerned with and 
subjectify themselves (Martin, Gutman and Hutton, 1988, p. 4). 
 
A Genealogy 
While there is a contemporary, and somewhat secular and Cartesian, focus on 
‘knowing oneself’ in philosophical discourse, the ancient Greeks took the 
precept of ‘being concerned with oneself’, of ‘taking care of oneself’, as the 
fundamental principle of moral philosophy, and it formed a basis to guide 
moral behaviour and conduct (Foucault, 1988a, pp. 20, 22). Foucault’s 
Technologies of the Self (1998a) provides an excellent example of how he 
applied his approach to analysing the self and society, within which he traces 
a genealogy of subjectification through technologies of the self. Foucault 
identifies that in Plato’s Apology, Socrates presented himself before his 
judges and argued that while they were concerned with the acquisition of 
power and wealth, he was concerned not only with ‘being concerned with 
himself’, but with continually inviting citizens to occupy themselves with 
themselves (a task which he would not abandon except with his “last breath”) 
(Foucault, 1988a, p. 21). Gregory of Nyssa, in his treatise On Virginity, 
described the importance of ‘shining the light’ in every corner of ‘one’s 
house’, and in every corner of ‘one’s soul’. In concerning oneself with one’s 
soul, one would recover the true essence of their soul, which had been 
tarnished by their body (Foucault, 1988a, p. 21). Epicurus, in his first text to 29 
 
serve as a guide of morals, Letter to Menoeceus, wrote that one should 
philosophise on one’s own soul both when one is young and when one is old, 
and that this task should be carried out throughout one’s lifetime; Epicurus 
organised teachings about everyday life around the precept of taking care of 
oneself, for the purpose of ‘mutual salvation’ (Foucault, 1988a, p. 22). These 
hermeneutic examples show that moral philosophy in antiquity was focused 
on the concern for and care of the self, and that concerning oneself with 
oneself was to be a constant practice – that is, subjectification of the self was 
to be continually practiced. In such a way, it can be seen that Foucault utilises 
his approach, as discussed earlier in the chapter, to explore the ways in which 
subjectification has occurred in antiquity. 
 
Foucault elaborates on this philosophical concern with taking care of oneself 
by exploring Plato’s Alcibiades I, a text involving a dialogue between the 
ambitious Alcibiades and Socrates. While the text is considered to not be an 
actual account of an interaction between Alcibiades and Socrates, the ‘truth’ 
of the text is not as important as is the significance that the Neopolatonists in 
the third and fourth centuries gave to the text (Foucault, 1988a, p. 23). The 
Neopolatonists organised Plato’s texts as a pedagogy and as a source of 
knowledge, placing Alcibiades I first in the collection and giving it primacy 
as a source of education; thus, it was a significant text in informing discursive 
truths about morality, conduct and self. Significantly, the first and core 
principle of Alcibiades I is the importance of the care of the self (Foucault, 
1988a, p. 23). In the dialogue, Alcibiades wishes to become a powerful 30 
 
political figure, but Socrates argues that Alcibiades knows very little, 
especially when compared to his Persian and Spartan rivals. Socrates tells 
Alcibiades that, in order to be competitive with his rivals, Alcibiades must 
‘take care of himself’. Here, the concern for the self refers to a real activity 
and practice of being concerned and ‘taking pains’ with one’s health and 
one’s education (Foucault, 1988a, p. 24). Further to this, Socrates helps 
Alcibiades to see that taking care of the self does not mean taking care of 
one’s body as such, but of the principle which uses the body: the soul. In this 
way, the principle activity of the care of the self is to care for one’s own soul. 
In order to do this, Socrates and Alcibiades conclude that one must 
continually examine one’s soul (Foucault, 1988a, p. 26). Importantly, in 
uncovering this example, Foucault is concerned with the ways in which 
bodies of knowledge have been established and developed, and in showing 
how they impact on individuals’ behaviours and sense of self through the 
process of subjectification, and through the practices and techniques of the 
self. 
 
One of the significant practices through which this care of the self was 
facilitated or conducted was through writing. In order to ‘take care of 
themselves’, people would write letters to themselves to be reread later, as 
well as write letters to others to help them with themselves and writing about 
their own ‘selves’ to others (Foucault, 1988a, p. 27). Foucault provides 
Marcus Aurelius as a clear example of this – in a letter he wrote to his friend 
Fronto, Aurelius wrote about the ‘unimportant’ everyday activities and 31 
 
thoughts he conducted during one particular day, including a ‘chat’ he had 
with his mother, thoughts on his relations with Fronto, and how he slept 
poorly that night due to illness. In this letter, Foucault argues, Aurelius is 
concerned with self-analysis, with how he felt and what he thought – it is a 
clear example of the practice of the cultivation of the self through the 
technique of writing (Foucault, 1988a, p. 29). 
 
Christianity, in both its early and contemporary forms, is a religion concerned 
with salvation of the soul, which must be obtained through acceptance of and 
alignment with an imposed set of conditions and rules of conduct (Foucault, 
1988a, p. 40). The duty of a follower to accept a set of obligations involves 
the acceptance of a set of discursive truths, along with acceptance of the 
authority of the institutionalised Church. Furthermore, Christianity is a 
religion which requires its followers to know what is occurring inside them, 
to acknowledge faults and to disclose any temptations, desires or sins either to 
God or to an other through confession. Only by doing this, in confessing 
one’s inner state, either in public or in private, is one able to purify their soul 
– self-analysis and care of the self is essential. The expression of one’s inner 
state, of their self, is a mark of ‘truth’ and it ought to be practised actively and 
continually (Foucault, 1988a, p. 40). In such a way, a member of the 
Christian religion is obligated to practice self-care, resulting in the cultivation 
of the self as a certain sort of ‘person’ who follows the moral code expected 
of them and, in doing so, ‘conducts their own conduct’.  32 
 
 
In The History of Sexuality (particularly volumes 2 and 3), Foucault explores 
how an ‘experience’ of ‘sexuality’ came to be constituted in society, where 
‘experience’ is the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of 
normativity and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture. One of the key 
elements of the series was Foucault’s analysis of the practices by which 
individuals were led to focus on themselves as subjects of desire, bringing 
into play between ‘themselves and themselves’ a certain relationship that 
allows them to discover their ‘true’ self (Foucault, 1990, p. 5). That is to say, 
part of Foucault’s work in the series was concerned with the practices by 
which people cultivated their self as a subject of sexuality. A brief exploration 
of this form of subjectivity will help illustrate how technologies of the self 
result in subjects conducting their own conduct – in this case in reference to a 
Christian moral code. 
 
Sexuality as an ethical concern appears at certain times in the Christian 
tradition to be of more importance than other ‘essential’ ethical concerns, 
being the subject of various and strict interdictions, the transgression of which 
is a serious ethical and religious offence (Foucault, 1990, p. 5). Religious 
discourses, including religious texts, served as functional devices that enabled 
individuals to watch over and shape their own conduct, and shape themselves 
as ethical subjects. In such a way, the moral codes set out by the religious 
discourses, including the strict interdictions governing behavioural 33 
 
expectations, formed knowledge of appropriate ethical and religious 
behaviour for members of the Church (Foucault, 1990, pp. 10-13). For 
example, Foucault argues that the discourses had a persistence of themes 
which problematised particular forms of conduct and idealised others: a 
general sense of fear and anxiety was present in regards to sexual activity as a 
form of pleasure; such behaviour was considered to lead to illness, harm to 
offspring, and harm to the entirety of humankind, as well as having negative 
effects on the soul and life of the individual (a fear which also existed in 
antiquity). Unfaithfulness was strongly regarded as dishonourable and sinful 
in both ancient philosophy and contemporary (and early) Christian discourse, 
while monogamy is expected. The common 19
th century image of the 
homosexual man was a stigmatised and negative one, through which 
homosexuality was problematised as transgressive; and the image of the 
abstinent and self-restrained self was regarded as a noble and an ideal mode 
of conduct (Foucault, 1990, pp. 15-20). In this way, the moral codes set out 
by the Christian tradition are a set of values and rules of action that are 
recommended and imposed through institutional forms, such as the family, 
the education system and the Church. This is not only a moral code, but it is 
also real behaviour – that is, the moral code, as the embodiment of a 
technology of the self, provides the individual with the manner in which they 
ought to conduct themselves, and it acts as an imagined (or actual) system of 
authority that provides a normalising discursive ‘truth’ (Foucault, 1990, pp. 
25-26). In such a way, the Christian self is one who subjectifies himself or 
herself as an ethical subject, and is one who conducts their own conduct. 
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Subjectification is a term that refers to the practices and processes by which 
human beings come to understand and think of themselves as certain sorts of 
‘persons’, as subjects of a particular kind. A genealogy of subjectification is 
one that explores the ways in which technologies of the self – techniques and 
practices of cultivating the self in a particular way – have developed and 
changed through history (Du Gay, 2007, p. 42; Rose, 2000, pp. 311-312). In 
the ancient Greco-Roman philosophical discourses, ‘taking care of oneself’ 
was a primary moral concern. This concern was practiced in various ways, an 
important example of which is the act of writing about one’s self. Through 
this practice, individuals would analyse their self in detail, and in doing so 
cultivate their self as a particular sort of subject (Foucault, 1988a, p. 29). 
Christianity is a religion that is concerned with the salvation of the soul, 
which can only be obtained through acceptance of and alignment with an 
imposed set of conditions and rules of conduct, including the requirement to 
have knowledge of the inner workings of the soul. In such a way, and through 
practices such as confession, the Christian person was cultivated as a certain 
type of subject who conducted their own conduct according to moral 
obligations (Foucault, 1990, pp. 25-26). 
 
This chapter has introduced the key concepts and methods developed and 
utilised by Foucault, and which operate as a ‘toolbox’ for a variety of 
researchers. It has been shown that Foucault regards the self as developing 
within our relation with ourselves, and a relation which has assumed its 
particular form because it has been the subject of the methods and practices 35 
 
that have sought to shape our understandings and conduct within the social 
world, which has resulted in the cultivation of the self as a certain sort of 
subject who conducts their own conduct. This chapter has explored 
Foucault’s approach and arguments regarding the self and society, and shown 
how Foucault utilises his approach to explore the historical contingencies of 
the self.  
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CHAPTER 2 – Elias’ Approach to the Self and Society 
 
This chapter will explore Elias’ approach and arguments regarding the self 
and society; firstly, I will turn to Elias’ approach to sociological inquiry, 
aiming to show how he stepped away from traditional historical accounts 
which view the self as homo clausus – the ‘enclosed self’ – to utilise an 
approach focusing on the processes of change of ‘figurations’, where he 
focused on the changing networks of interdependencies among human beings 
(Du Gay, 2007, pp. 25-26; Mennell, 2012). The chapter will then explore 
Elias’ arguments regarding the ‘civilising process’ and his account of the self. 
Overall, this chapter aims to provide the reader with an understanding of 
Elias’ approach and some of his arguments regarding the self and the 
‘civilising processes’, showing how his approach also provides some useful 
arguments regarding the self and society. 
 
On ‘Homo Clausus’ and Figurations 
In The Civilizing Process (2000), Elias shows the processes by which the 
structure of Western society has changed over time, and how the notion and 
experience of self and their related forms of behaviour have changed over 
time (Elias, 2000, p. xi). In The Civilizing Process (2000), Elias argues that 
there has been an assumption of dualism in the relationship between ‘society’ 
and the ‘person’ – that philosophical and historical discussions assume that 
‘society’ and the ‘individual’ are fundamentally distinct and pre-formed 37 
 
objects, with a clear line between them, in which the forces of one determine 
the other (Elias, 2000, p.469; Du Gay, 2007, p. 23). Elias identifies the image 
of the person as: 
An entirely free, independent being, a ‘closed personality’ inwardly 
quite self-sufficient and separate from all other people, has behind it a 
long tradition in the development of European societies (Elias, 2000, p. 
470). 
It has been assumed that, on the one hand, ‘persons’, who are ‘closed off’ in 
relation to the societies they are part of, and ‘societies’ on the other, are two 
separate and distinct phenomena, rather than being seen as two aspects of the 
same being (Elias, 2000, p. 469). For example, Parsons argues that there is 
‘interpenetration’ between the individual actor and the social system, yet this 
in itself shows that this approach places a clear distinction between the 
individual and society as two separate objects, despite the so-called 
‘interpenetration’ – that is, while the ‘individual’ is influenced by ‘society’, 
and ‘society’ is influenced by different ‘individuals’, they are still taken to be 
two quite distinct entities (Elias, 2000, pp. 469-470). While dichotomies have 
shown to be useful for understanding the world in many fields of sociology 
(such as distinctions between ethnic groups, or distinctions between males 
and females), as well as other disciplines, Elias argues that this notion of 
dualism between ‘society’ and ‘persons’ obstructs our understanding of the 
processes of change over time of both the self and ‘society’, since the 
individual and society are fundamentally two aspects of the same being 
(Elias, 2000, p. 470;Du Gay, 2007, p. 23).  38 
 
 
Elias argues that there is an assumption of the ‘enclosed human’, an image of 
the human in general, which is a: 
Conception of the individual as homo clausus, a little world in himself 
[or herself] who ultimately exists quite independently of the great world 
outside…. His [or her] core, his [or her] being, his [or her] true self 
appears likewise as something divided within him [or her] by an 
invisible wall from everything outside, including every other human 
being (Elias, 2000, p. 472). 
In this way, homo clausus is an assumption of the self as completely 
enclosed, separate and static. The approach of the individual as homo clausus 
is problematic because there is a rigid barrier between the human being on 
one hand, and the social world ‘outside’ (Elias, 2000, p. 472). Thus, Elias 
argues that it is not justified to place a sharp dividing line between the 
‘inside’ of the ‘enclosed person’ and the ‘external’ societal world as the 
foundation of sociological thinking: so long as individuals are viewed as 
‘enclosed’, society can only be understood as nothing more than a collection 
of separate, static homines clausi (Elias, 2000, p. 480). To view humans as a 
collection of separate and distinct homines clausi “obstructs [our] 
understanding of the long-term processes which people undergo on both the 
individual and social planes” (Elias, 2000, p. 470). In this way, Elias’ view of 
the social world, and his conception of what the self is, involves an attempt to 
shift from traditional perspectives. 39 
 
 
As such, Elias was critical of traditional “Western philosophy, and of the hold 
which it continued to have... over sociologists’ modes of thinking” (Mennell 
and Goudsblom, 1998, p. 33), and he strongly opposed the notion of homo 
clausus as a theme throughout modern philosophy (Elias, 2000, p. 474). Elias 
argues that this conception has had “an extraordinary persistence” (Elias, 
2000, pp. 474-475) and recurs throughout much of modern philosophy, 
particularly noting the works of Descartes and Kant (2000, p. 475). For Elias, 
it is around the time of the ‘Renaissance’ and onwards that the basic 
philosophical form of the self – the way of identifying the human as homo 
clausus that is still pervasive today – developed in a number of societies to 
the point where it is now taken as a given (Elias, 1991, p. 98).  
 
To take Descartes as an example, the French philosopher, in his well-known 
Meditations, questions the very existence of the ‘outside’ world, and what we 
perceive and sense. Descartes uses a thought experiment in which he 
imagines that his perception and sense experiences are being deceived by a 
demon, and therefore he cannot take anything he perceives with his senses to 
be true or real (since what he sees, hears, feels, tastes and smells could be, 
and he must assume is, a deception), and also assumes that his memory tells 
him lies – a frame of thought known as Cartesian scepticism (Descartes, 
2000, p. 156). Descartes concludes “cogito, ergo sum” – “I think; therefore I 
am” (Descartes, 2000, p. 152). That is, Descartes argues that the demon may 40 
 
mislead him as much as the demon wishes, but the demon cannot reduce 
Descartes to being nothing, concluding that as long as he thinks something, as 
long as thought is present, Descartes must exist – the presence of thought is 
taken as the evidence of Descartes’ existence (Descartes, 156). In this way, 
Descartes proposed a conception of human beings as isolated subjects, 
“thinking away inside their own containers” (Mennell, 1989, p. 189). While 
Elias does not contest Descartes’ Meditations themselves, he points out that 
this misleading notion of the self as homo clausus has developed historically, 
and is problematic in sociological inquiry. 
 
The homo clausus, as ‘a thinking statue’ (static, separate and distinct from 
others and the social world), can view and interpret the social world, but is 
still divided from it – there is still an invisible wall that denies their capacity 
to truly interact (Elias, 1991, p. 117). “They look from outside into a world or 
from inside out into a world – however one chooses to put it – a world which 
is always separate to them” (Elias, 1991, p. 118). While this may be 
experienced as authentic, Elias argues that this conception of homo clausus 
“gives a misleading twist to our ideas on the relation of person to person, 
individual to society” (Elias, 1991, p. 118). Elias then points out that this 
experience and notion of homo clausus is not universal, but historically 
contingent – dependent upon the specific “situation and particular make-up of 
people in specific societies” (Elias, 1991, p. 118). In such a way, Elias argues 
that a modern philosopher has a strong tendency to “take up his [or her] 
position ‘in’ the single individual. He [or she] looks through his [or her] eyes 41 
 
at the world ‘outside’ as if through small windows; or he [or she] meditates 
from the same standpoint on what is happening ‘within’” (Elias, 1991, p. 
119). 
  
Instead, Elias aims to take a different ‘starting-point’ (2000, p. 474), and 
argues that there is no inside and outside within the human world, and that 
‘society’ and the self are fundamentally one and the same (Elias, 2000, p. 
480). Elias offers an alternative way of understanding the relationship 
between society and the ‘person’, using the term figurations to refer to “the 
network of interdependencies among human beings” (Elias, 2000, pp. 481-
482), and argues that this is what binds humans together. As Elias writes: 
The image of man as a ‘closed personality’ is here replaced by the 
image of man as an ‘open personality’ who possesses a greater or lesser 
degree of relative (but never absolute and total) autonomy vis-à-vis 
other people and who is, in fact, fundamentally oriented toward and 
dependent on other people throughout his life. The network of 
interdependencies among human beings is what binds them together 
(Elias, 2000, pp. 481-482). 
Elias proposes this alternative to homo clausus as being homines aperti – the 
‘open person’. In this way, humans only exist as pluralities – that is, societies 
of humans are pluralities of humans – and thus to think of them as separate 
and individualised is obstructive and misleading. Elias, through his term 
figurations, urges us to think of society neither as an abstract set of attributes 42 
 
of a grouping of individuals, nor as a structural system separate from or 
beyond individuals. Rather, society is to be understood as a network of 
interdependent humans, as figurations of human beings (Elias, 2000, p. 482).  
Furthermore, these figurations are formed and change over time, they are 
processes, and this is essential to Elias’ approach to the self and the 
‘civilising processes’ (Du Gay, 2007, p. 26). 
 
Elias argues that it may be helpful in some ways to take the ‘traditional’ 
perspective to analysing history and the social world, and that “it is no doubt 
fruitful and even indispensable to see history in this way, as a mosaic of 
individual actions of individual people”, since it is the “individual agents and 
their various actions that we see” (2000, p. 188). Elias argues that “on the one 
hand, we might enquire how this or that man gained power”, while “on the 
other, we may ask… which social structure, which development of human 
relations…” and which processual changes have led to the institution of the 
king or prince to sustain itself, as an example (2000, p. 188). Elias then points 
out that analysing the processual changes in figurations – in the 
interdependent social networks – provides the capacity to explore the 
‘civilizing processes’ over long periods of time (Elias, 2000, p. 188). In this 
way, Elias is interested in the process of changes in social figurations, in the 
networks of interdependencies themselves (Elias, 2000, p. 481; Van Krieken, 
1990). 
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As Stephen Mennell (1989, p. 199) puts forward, Elias’ approach to 
sociological analysis involves the understanding that the world, including the 
‘social world’, is in a process of constant change and movement. In this way, 
Elias’ approach is often referred to as ‘figurational sociology’ and ‘process 
sociology’ – that is, that an appropriate analysis of the social world will 
explore the changing processes of the “connections between power, 
behaviour, emotions and knowledge in (to a greater or lesser extent) long-
term perspective” (Mennell, 2012). Elias emphasises the importance of 
looking at processes of change within figurations, explaining that there is 
often an unhelpful tendency in sociological research to reduce processes to 
static states: “The process – the individual human being as a process in 
growing up, human beings together as a process in the development of 
mankind – is reduced in thought to a state” (Elias, 2000, p. 471). An example 
Elias gives is that “we say, ‘The wind is blowing’, as if the wind were 
separate from its blowing, as if a wind could exist which did not blow’ (1978, 
p. 112). In this way, Elias is concerned with the long-term processes of 
change within human figurations, rather than in defining and analysing static 
social states. Further, as Goudsblom points out, the key areas of focus of 
Elias’ approach, and process sociology in general, are that humans are plural 
and interdependent, that the figurations they exist within are constantly 
changing and moving, that the processual changes in human figurations (in 
history) are mostly unplanned or haphazard, and that knowledge itself is 
developed within figurations (1977, pp. 6, 105). In such a way, 
interdependence and process are fundamental in Elias’ approach (Mennell 
and Goudsblom, 1998, p. 36). 44 
 
 
In process sociology, individuals’ identities, interests and objectives are 
variable and fluctuate with the form and dynamics of the relationships 
between those individuals – forms of behaviour and a sense of self are 
acquired “in conjunction with other people, from the structure of society in 
which the individual grows up” (Elias, 1991, p. 36). In this way, it can be 
seen that figurations do not connect people with already-existing forms of 
personhood and behaviour, but rather their characteristics and dimensions are 
acquired through the networks of interdependent humans they are a part of – 
the characteristics and actions of a person are dependent on, and inseparable 
from, the relations in which they are involved (Elias, 2000, p. 481). In this 
way, social relations and the sense of self are interdependent, and the ‘person’ 
is a fundamental part of the figurations in which they are involved. (Du Gay, 
2007, p. 26). Therefore, in order to understand the self, it is essential to look 
at the location or context in which they are placed within the changing 
figurations. These forms of personhood and behaviour, as with the figurations 
they are attributed to, go through a continuous process of change over time, 
and so in order to fully understand a particular form of self within a certain 
context, it is essential to explore those particular figurations and the purposes 
they serve, as well as gain an understanding of the historical context of those 
figurations and in what ways they have changed over time (Du Gay, 2007, p. 
26; Strauss, 1977, p. 164). By utilising this figurational approach in The 
Civilizing Process, Elias explores the ways in which the structure of Western 
society has changed over time, and also how the sense of self and forms of 
behaviour have changed over time (Elias, 2000, p. xi). 45 
 
 
The Civilising of the Self 
In The Civilizing Process, Elias explores “how and why in the course of 
history the structure of Western society continuously changes, and… at the 
same time… why, in the same areas, the standard of behaviour and the 
psychical habits of Western peoples change” (Elias, 2000, p. xi). In this way, 
Elias utilises his ‘process sociology’ approach to explore how the sense of 
self and related behaviours developed and changed as the result of changing 
figurations; Elias argues that there has been a long-term process of growing 
‘pacification’ and self-control in Europe since the early Middle Ages (Smith, 
2001, p. 21). 
 
Elias argues that contemporary society in the West is characterised by a 
degree of monopolisation, including a monopoly of military force and 
finances (as well as taxation), whereby both reinforce one another and 
facilitate the maintenance of the monopolisation. This monopolisation of 
what Elias terms ‘authority’ facilitates the centralised administration, known 
as the ‘state’ (Elias, 2000, p. 268). In The Civilizing Process (2000), Elias’ 
argument is that there has been a long-term process in the West since the 
early Middle Ages of a growing ‘pacification’ and self-restraint, and that 
prior to this there was no centralised system of government. Society was 
characterised by frequent violent struggles for local authority, with ‘top-
down’ authority being loose and fragmented, and there was no consistent 46 
 
pressure by authorities upon individuals to constrain these violent tendencies 
– authority was ‘decentralised’ (Elias, 2000, p. xii; Smith, 2001, pp. 21, 23). 
Elias describes how, over time, there has been a processual change towards 
the monopolisation of authority of the ‘state’. Elias writes, describing as an 
example of struggles for local authority: 
One group is victorious and gains control of the power chances of the 
vanquished; a still smaller number of people controls a still greater 
number of power chances; a still greater number of people are 
eliminated from free competition; and the process is repeated until 
finally, in the extreme case, one individual controls all power chances 
and all the others are dependent on him (Elias, 2000, p. 269). 
Elias notes that, historically, it is usually large associations of people that 
hold the monopoly of authority, which come to form ‘states’, rather than one 
individual (Elias, 2000, pp. 269-270). In this way, Elias argues that systems 
of authority and administration – ‘states’ – became more centralised and 
stable over time; importantly, part of this increasing stabilisation meant a 
need by the state to facilitate a stable population that was not prone to violent 
outbursts or impulses, and thus more centralised controls were utilised to 
‘pacify’ the populations, and to move towards being more ‘civilised’ (Smith, 
2001, p. 23). 
 
For Elias, ‘civilisation’ refers to the expression of “the self-consciousness of 
the West… It sums up everything in which Western society of the last two or 
three centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or ‘more primitive’ 
contemporary ones” (Elias, 2000, p. 5). In such a way, Elias points out that he 47 
 
does not take his work on the ‘civilising processes’ to be a judgement of some 
‘improvement’ of society over time, or that being ‘civilised’ is ‘better’ than 
being ‘uncivilised’. Rather, Elias is interested in analysing these changes over 
time from what is called the ‘uncivilised’ towards the ‘civilised’, and how 
‘civilisation’ has come to be taken as ‘superior’ (Ritzer, 2000, p. 509). As van 
Krieken writes: 
What we experience as ‘civilization’ is founded on a particular habitus, 
a particular psychic structure which has changed over time, and which 
can only be understood in connection with changes in the forms taken 
by broader social relationships (van Krieken, 1998, p. 91). 
What Elias calls ‘habitus’ refers to individuals’ ‘personality makeup’, to those 
parts of our personality makeup which are not fundamental or given, but 
‘habituated’ and learned deeply since birth, and which are developed as a 
result of the networks of interdependencies in which we are involved and 
‘grow up’ in (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998, pp. 15, 43). Mennell and 
Goudsblom (1998, p. 15) argue that habitus guides behaviour, while also 
being continually formed within changing social figurations. In such a way, 
Elias argues that the long-term changes in state formation towards the more 
‘civilised’ is closely connected with the changing forms of human habitus and 
behaviours, and Elias aims to demonstrate this in The Civilizing Process, 
utilising specific and ‘concrete’ data in his analysis (Mennell and Goudsblom, 
1998, p. 15). 
 
Elias argues that the ‘civilised’ habitus is one that is self-restrained and 
controlled, and it first became present in the noble courts (Smith, 2001, p. 48 
 
23). As richer, and more centralised, feudal estates slowly formed, the 
‘warrior class’ formed an upper stratum which attended court and developed 
what Elias calls courtois, and later civilité, forms of behaviour – standards of 
how one should behave in the presence of others, and of how one should 
restrain their impulses (Elias, 2000, p. xii; Smith, 1999, p. 80). Elias writes 
that “behaviour moves very perceptibly towards the standard that we denote 
today by a derivative of the word civilité as ‘civilized’ behaviour” (Elias, 
2000, p. xii). Elias analyses a guide written in 1530 by Erasmus of Rotterdam 
on how one should behave, known as De civilitate morum puerilium (‘On 
civility in boys’). Elias cites Erasmus’ text as the starting-point of this 
concept of civilité as ‘civilised’ behaviour – the treatise was widely circulated 
in a variety of translations across Europe and was socially accepted as a guide 
on behaviour (Elias, 2000, p. 47). Erasmus’ treatise serves as an instruction 
for noble boys on how to ‘outwardly’ present themselves, and to take concern 
for their bodily ‘propriety’, covering areas such as the appropriate way to 
carry oneself, gestures, dress, facial expressions and how to blow one’s nose 
(Elias, 2000, p. 49). Elias also utilises a variety of other ‘manners books’ 
from the late Middle Ages to the Victorian period, noting how these manners 
change over time (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998, p. 15). Further, as these 
forms of behaviour became deeply habituated, they came to form the habitus 
of the members of society – that is, they came to be internalised, and 
functioned as a part of the personality makeup of subjects without a ‘second 
thought’ (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998, p. 16). 
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Elias notes that the ‘civilising process’ “is a change of human conduct and 
sentiment in a quite specific direction” (Elias, 2000, p. 365) – a direction 
towards more ‘civilised’ behaviour, whereby there is a ‘social constraint 
towards self-constraint’ and the tendency to restrain one’s impulses (2000, p. 
365). Elias argues that societies with more stable and centralised systems of 
authority involve longer chains of interdependencies, and the individual is 
protected from attack in violent struggles for local authority (since these 
occur less frequently, if at all). In parallel, the individual is also compelled to 
restrain themselves and to suppress any impulses towards violence in order to 
maintain this stability (Elias, 2000, p. 370). It is also in the individual’s best 
interest to restrain themselves from their impulses. As Elias argues:  
The more threatened is the social existence of the individual who gives 
way to spontaneous impulses and emotions, the greater is the social 
advantage of those able to moderate their affects, and the more strongly 
is each individual constrained from an early age to take account of the 
effects of his or her own or other people’s actions on a whole series of 
links in the social chain (Elias, 2000, p. 370).  
In such a way, the networks of interdependencies influence the sense of self, 
resulting in an individual who restrains their impulses for the sake of their 
own social existence – that is, the subject is one who is compelled to conduct 
themselves in the appropriate manner through self-restraint, who is compelled 
to control themselves according to social expectations, and who takes on 
these expectations and behaviours as a part of their habitus (Elias, 2000, p. 
370). In such a way, Elias shows in The Civilising Process that there has been 
a process of change towards monopolisation of authority, and that this has 50 
 
been closely linked with the development of the ‘civilised’ habitus as a result 
of the social constraint towards self-constraint (Smith, 2001, p. 23). 
 
This chapter has discussed Elias’ figurational sociology approach and his 
criticism of the notion of the self as homo clausus. Further, this chapter has 
explored Elias’ approach and arguments regarding the self and society, 
particularly within what he calls the ‘civilising processes’. It has been 
demonstrated how Elias’ approach and arguments are useful for 
understanding and analysing the self and society, with the purpose of 
providing an introduction to Elias’ work and a foundation for further 
discussion in Chapter Three regarding the similarities and convergence in 
Elias’ approach with Foucault’s. 
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CHAPTER 3 – Comparing Foucault and Elias 
 
This chapter will demonstrate some of the similarities and differences present 
in the works of Foucault and Elias, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, 
respectively. Further, I will argue that there is some convergence between the 
two approaches taken by Foucault and Elias, and that Elias’ work can offer 
some benefits to a Foucaultian approach. 
 
Both Elias and Foucault undermine the notion of homo clausus (Smith, 1999, 
p. 82). Elias’ work aims to show how the figurations within which one exists 
fundamentally determine the self – the self is inseparable from the figurations 
within which they operate (Elias, 2000, p. 481). While Elias quite explicitly 
addresses this issue of homo clausus, and Foucault does not, it is still present 
in Foucault’s work. Foucault’s work, as discussed in Chapter One, begins 
from a starting point of the “decision that universals do not exist” (Foucault, 
2008b, p.3). In such a way, Foucault’s analysis of the self involves not 
presuming the self as a given, but to explore how it has developed through 
historical contingencies. For Foucault, the sense of self and the resulting 
behaviours are formed within discursive practices – the self is not ‘closed 
off’, but determined and experienced within discursive formations and 
practices (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18). That is to say, in Foucault’s work the 
modern self is penetrated by the ‘technologies of the self’ – discursive 
formations and practices penetrate the self and it is within these techniques 
and their related bodies of knowledge that the self is cultivated and the human 52 
 
is encouraged to have concern for the self (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18). In such a 
way, Foucault also undermines homo clausus, since Foucault’s ‘subject’ is 
fundamentally a part of the discursive formations and practices and not 
‘closed off’. 
 
There is also some similarity in Elias’ and Foucault’s approaches and 
criticisms of history and philosophy. Elias’ emphasis on the processual 
changes within human figurations is essential to his approach, and he regards 
it as a significant shift from traditional forms of history and philosophy, of 
which he is significantly critical (Elias, 1991, p. 98; 2000, p. 481). Elias 
argues that it is worthwhile to focus on the processes of the changing 
figurations, and argues against the traditional approaches of understanding 
society as a collection of static and separate individuals (Elias, 2000, p. 471). 
In a similar way (as discussed in Chapter One), Foucault’s understanding of 
history is significantly different to traditional forms and he also argues against 
the tendency within modern philosophy and history to view history as a 
single, unified object. Foucault is critical of the traditional historical 
approach, which assumes history to be a sort of teleological development 
leading to a final ‘true’ state of things. Rather, Foucault argues that history is 
far more haphazard in its development and is full of contingencies, being in a 
process of continuously shifting and overlapping (as well as being continually 
‘retold’) (Foucault 1972, pp. 3, 5, 9-10). In this way, both scholars emphasise 
the importance of history as an ongoing process, and argue against the 53 
 
tendency to view history as having some final ‘true’ and static state or as 
being comprised of static objects and individuals. 
 
Further, there is some similarity in the ways in which Elias and Foucault 
understand the development of knowledge. In Chapter Two it was briefly 
mentioned that process sociology regards the development of knowledge as 
occurring within human figurations themselves (Goudsblom, 1977, pp. 6, 
105). As Elias writes, the “development of knowledge… is inseparable from 
the direction of changes in the form and structure of the communal life of 
humans” (Elias, 1992, p. 32). For Foucault, forms of knowledge, and the 
‘selves’ about which they speak, are systematically developed within 
discursive formations; discourses are productive, and it is within discursive 
formations that knowledges and ‘truths’ are formed, as demonstrated in 
Chapter One (Foucault, 1971, p. 8). While Elias and Foucault do not share 
precisely the same perspective, it can be seen that there is certainly a 
similarity in their approach: that knowledge is formed within the relations 
between human beings and institutions. However, as Burke (2012) points out, 
while Foucault operates from a standpoint of not accepting the existence of 
social objects a priori and presuming that universals do not exist (Foucault, 
2008b, pp. 2-3), Elias was wary of what he called a ‘relativist trap’, and 
believed in the possibility of obtaining knowledge that is “congruent” with 
“reality”, noting the ‘scientific knowledge’ of nature as the best example 
(Elias, 1992, p. 172). In this sense, Elias sees knowledge as something which 
can be obtained, while Foucault understands knowledge as being produced 54 
 
within discourse, and not existing outside of it. This is indeed a significant 
difference, and clearly points out that there are limits in the similarities in 
approach and argument of Foucault and Elias.  
 
There is also, in one sense, a similarity present in Elias’ work with Foucault’s 
notion of power. Elias is concerned with the interdependent networks of 
humans, and when he is interested in power, he is interested in it as it exists in 
the networks of interdependencies (Elias, 2000, p. 481). When Elias discusses 
kingship, he explains that he is not interested in how some specific individual 
has gained power, but in how the interdependent networks and social 
structures have enabled the institution to sustain itself (Elias, 2000, p. 188). 
For Elias, figurations contain continually changing power balances among the 
interdependent networks of humans (Smith, 1999, p. 80). Similarly, 
Foucault’s account of power, as discussed in Chapter One, is one that 
understands power as existing in the relations between subjects, institutions 
and forms of knowledge – Foucault’s account of power is also one that 
understands power as diffused in relations (Foucault, 2008a p. 93). Although 
Elias does not refute power as being a zero-sum object in the way Foucault 
does, he arguably has some similarity with Foucault’s approach – that is, 
there is a focus on the networks themselves, not of power as being possessed 
by “this man or that man” (Elias, 2000, p. 188).  
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Nonetheless, for Elias, there is a more direct relationship between a particular 
network of interdependencies and the self, and accordingly the behaviours 
they produce. For example, when discussing the increasing spread of pressure 
for foresight and a sense of personal constraint, Elias argues that: 
To an increasing degree, the complex functioning of Western societies, 
with their high division of labour, depends on the lower agrarian and 
urban strata controlling their conduct increasingly through insight into 
its more long-term and more remote connections (Elias, 2000, p. 351). 
In this sense, as Robert van Krieken (1990) argues, Elias presents the social 
conditions as being the explanation for the changes in the sense of self and 
behaviour. Foucault, on the other hand, sees the techniques of the self as a 
sort of intermediate process of translation (van Krieken, 1990), through which 
the requirements of behaviour, of what is expected (such as the importance 
for self-mastery or appropriate sexual practices, as defined by the appropriate 
bodies of knowledge) are internally subjectified (Foucault, 1990, pp. 10-13, 
15-20). Both Elias and Foucault, in this regard, seem to understand power as 
producing forms of behaviour, but Elias’ account sees figurations as 
impacting behaviour in a more unmediated manner, whereby the human is 
themselves inseparable from those figurations (van Krieken, 1990). In this 
sense, there are similarities in Elias’ and Foucault’s approaches to power, but 
certainly only to a point. 
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Another significant similarity between the arguments made by Foucault and 
Elias is apparent in their respective discussions regarding the shift from 
‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’. As discussed in Chapter One, Foucault regards the 
change in forms of government from the Middle Ages to contemporary forms 
as involving a shift towards ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991a). That is, 
Foucault argues that the centralisation of systems of authority has resulted in 
the development of various bodies of knowledge, and that these bodies of 
knowledge are utilised to achieve a sense of wellbeing among the population 
through a variety of ‘techniques of the self’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 102). In such 
a way, Foucault argues that ways of constraining populations have shifted to 
forms whereby subjects ‘conduct their own conduct’, resulting from the 
various range of attempts by authorities of different types to act upon 
individuals and their ways of conducting themselves (Rose, 2000, p. 315; van 
Krieken, 1990). That is, Foucault’s argument regarding government of the 
self and others purports that there has been a shift in forms of government 
whereby the individual actively cultivates their sense of self and their 
behaviours, rather than being acted upon directly, and in a ‘negative’, 
coercive form, by systems of authority (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18; van Krieken, 
1990). Similarly, Elias regards the changing forms of the structure of Western 
societies as being a process towards ‘civility’ and the monopolisation of 
authority, in terms of military force and financial structures (Elias, 2000, p. 
268). Elias focused his analysis on the gradual transformation of the 
personality structure towards self-constraint, moving towards a more 
‘civilised’ and less impulsive self, and Elias connected this change in 
‘habitus’ as being the result of the change towards the monopolization of 57 
 
authority and social interdependency (Elias, 2000, p. 409). There is a 
similarity present between both Foucault and Elias in this sense, since both 
scholars identify a shift in the forms of government from the Middle Ages 
onwards, from ‘tradition’ to ‘modernity’, and plot how these influenced the 
sense of self. 
 
More importantly, both scholars argue that these changes in the structure of 
Western societies have led to a change in the ways in which individuals come 
to both experience and conduct themselves. That is, both Foucault and Elias 
argue that the ‘modern’ self is one who conducts their own conduct or 
internally constrains their behaviour according to the appropriate bodies of 
knowledge. Both Foucault and Elias argue that the ‘modern’ self is one who 
actively participates in the maintenance of their own conduct (van Krieken, 
1990). Foucault argues that there has been an increasing focus on the concern 
for the self and a concern for self-mastery (Foucault, 1988a, p. 24), while 
Elias argues that there has been increasing pressure for self-constraint for the 
sake of social gain and survival (Elias, 2000, p. 370).  
 
Moreover, as Smith points out, both Foucault and Elias focus some of their 
analyses regarding the conduct of the self on historical works giving advice 
on how one is to conduct themselves in relation to themselves and others 
(Smith, 1999, pp. 83-84). For example, Chapter One discussed a variety of 
works analysed by Foucault regarding the technologies of the self, such as 
Alcibiades I, while Chapter Two discussed Elias’ analysis of Erasmus’ De 58 
 
civilitate morum puerilium. In this way, both Foucault and Elias focus their 
analyses on pedagogy’s of advice regarding the appropriate ways to conduct 
the self (Smith, 1999, p. 83).  
 
It has been shown that, despite some distinct differences, there exist some 
important similarities between the approaches taken and arguments made by 
Foucault and Elias regarding the self and society. Indeed, both criticise 
modern forms of philosophy and history (largely since the Renaissance) as 
being limited in their approaches, arguing for an understanding of society and 
individuals as being in a constant process of change and movement, rather 
than as static and stable. Further, and importantly, both scholars argue that the 
modern individual is a ‘self’ who actively participates in their own conduct, 
and whose sense of self exists within the relations between humans (and, in 
Foucault’s case, discursive formations). In such a way, there is considerable 
convergence in the approaches taken by Foucault and Elias, and therefore it is 
argued that their two forms of thinking can offer contributions to the other. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has offered discussion on some of the similarities that exist 
between the approaches and arguments made by Foucault and Elias regarding 
the self and society in order to demonstrate the presence of some convergence 
in their thinking. Chapter One introduced the reader to Foucault’s key 
concepts and approach to analysing the ‘history of the present’. Foucault 
offers a distinct perspective, regarding ‘truth’ as not given, universal or 
fundamental, but rather as being systematically developed within discursive 
formations and the relations between people (Foucault, 1971, p. 8). Chapter 
One also showed how Foucault utilises his approach to explore the notion of 
the self and society, in which he argues that the experience of the self and 
related behaviours are cultivated through the process of subjectification and 
the technologies of the self (Foucault, 1986a). For Foucault, the experience of 
the self is developed and cultivated within discursive formations and 
practices. 
 
Elias’ approach and arguments, as discussed in Chapter Two, differ in some 
ways to Foucault’s, but may also be considered to have some similarities and 
alignments with a Foucaultian approach. In Chapter Two, it was shown that 
Elias criticises the approaches of modern philosophy which view the self as 
homo clausus (Elias, 2000, p. 470). Instead, Elias argues for the view of the 
individual as homines aperti – the ‘open personality’; in taking this 
understanding, Elias’ sociological approach is one that views society as being 60 
 
in constant flux, focusing his analyses on the processes of change over time 
regarding the self and the structure of society (Elias, 1991, p. 36). For Elias, 
society is best understood as changing figurations, or networks of 
interdependent humans, and it is within these interdependent networks that 
Elias regards the sense of self, as ‘habitus’, as being developed (Elias, 2000, 
p. 482; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998, p. 16). 
 
In describing the approaches and arguments made by Foucault and Elias 
regarding the self and society, this thesis has discussed some of the 
similarities that exist between the thinking of the two scholars. It has been 
shown that Foucault and Elias both regard individuals, within societal 
structures, as ‘selves’ whose conduct is the result of the active participation of 
the self – of being actively concerned with one’s own behaviour and sense of 
self. While Foucault and Elias both take distinct approaches, Chapter Three 
has shown that there are some significant similarities and that some 
convergence is present in their thinking. This being so, it has also been argued 
that it may be possible to utilise some of the aspects of an Eliasian approach 
within a Foucaultian framework of inquiry, as well as combining Foucault’s 
thought within an Eliasian sociological account. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has provided some discussion regarding some 
significant similarities between the approaches and arguments of Foucault 
and Elias regarding the self and society. This thesis has aimed to reopen the 
scholarship and discourse regarding the similarities present in the works of 61 
 
these two scholars, and to contribute further to this discussion. There has been 
limited scholarship regarding the convergence of the thought of Foucault and 
Elias, and further research should be considered in this area, not only on the 
analysis of the self and society, but also within other areas of inquiry. 
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